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Abstract
During the last decades, we observe a liberalization trend in the services sector globally. Using the
Chinese exporting firm data, this paper studies how multi-product firms adjust their export strategies in
response to the services trade liberalization across export destination countries. Our study finds a highly
significant positive relation between the services trade liberalization in the destination countries and each
firm’s export diversify, which is measured as the product scope, the Herfindahl-Hirschman style index, or
the value skewness across varieties,export product switch. Our empirical analysis further finds that firms
increase the relatedness of their exporting varieties towards the OECD countries, but reduce it towards
the non-OECD countries. With a conventional multi-product firm model, we explore the mechanisms
behind all our empirical findings.
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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis in 2008, we have observed a rising of the anti-globalization movements and the
protectionism all over the world. The China-U.S. trade conflict took place in 2018, which further increased
the uncertainty of trade policies faced by Chinese exporting firms. However, though the liberalization process
encountered obstacles in the commodity trade, the openness level of the services sector have been increasing
across countries globally. According to the FDI restrictiveness index recorded by the organization of OECD,
most countries have relaxed the restrictions on the FDI in the services sector. In this paper, our main target
is to explore how Chinese exporting firms adjust the extensive and intensive margins of export in response to
the services liberalization process in the destination countries, i.e., the export value, diversity, and varieties’
similarity.
In our study, we measure services trade liberalization in each country with the FDI restrictiveness index
recorded by the OECD organization. Taking a view of the data from 2010 to 2017, we observe a rising
trend of the services trade liberalization globally. Generally, the openness level of the OECD countries is
much higher than non-OECD countries. In each sub-sector, the openness levels are quite different among
countries, and in each country, the openness levels are also significantly different among the sub-sectors.
Using the Chinese exporting firm data between 2010 and 2016, we study how firms adjust their export
strategies during the services trade liberalization process. Specifically, we explore the adjustment of export
value, product scope (Lopresti, 2016; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Bernard et al., 2011), market concentration of
the core product (Mayer et al., 2014), export product switch, and the relatedness of varieties (Zahavi and
Lavie, 2013). Our empirical analysis finds that: (i) in response to the services trade liberalization in the
destination country, Chinese firms are more likely to diversify their exporting diversification and decrease
the skewness ratio; (ii) in a more liberalized market, firms take more flexible product strategy to adjust the
export scope more frequently. (iii) services trade liberalization increases the relatedness of diversification for
the OECD countries, but it lowers the relatedness of diversification for the non-OECD countries. (iv)services
trade liberalization has larger effects on product diversification in the destinations with better institution
environment. With a conventional multi-product firm model, we further discuss the mechanism behind our
empirical findings. Basically, the intuitive explanation is as follows. Services trade liberalization lowers the
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firms’ marginal cost on sales, i.e., financing cost, transportation cost, information collection cost, management
cost, and so on. A reduction in the marginal cost will increase both the export value and scope for each firm
in the destination country. However, this positive effect is heterogeneous among different varieties. The core
product increase in less proposition, while the margin product increases in a higher proposition. In another
words, the export value among varieties will be more dispersed.
Overall, our study contributes to the existing literature by three points. Firstly, the existing related
literature are either focus on the study of the impacts of the goods trade liberalization (Yi and Meng, 2018),
or the services trade liberalization in the home country (Barone and Cingano, 2011; Javorcik and Li, 2013;
Head et al., 2014; Bas, 2014; Hoekman and Shepherd, 2017; Shi, 2016; Li and Zhang, 2018; Sun et al., 2018)
. However, no literature studies the impacts of the services liberalization in the destination country on
the firms’ exporting decisions from the exporting country. Our study fills up this gap. It is important to
distinguish the services liberalization process in the destination country from that in the exporting country.
The liberalization process in the home country may affect firms’ production and sales procedures. We cannot
distinguish whether the services liberalization benefits firms’ production or sales processes, or both. However,
if we find a positive relation between the destination country’s services liberalization process and the export
value and scope, we can confirm that the services trade liberalization benefits firms’ sales procedures, i.e., the
financing, transportation, information collection, management, and so on. Another importance for studying
the liberalization in the destination country is that we are able to explore whether a country’s services trade
liberalization process benefits the foreign firms and the domestic sales. All the previous study only confirms
that the services liberalization benefits the domestic firms’ export performance. Secondly, we obtain a new
empirical finding on the export’s relatedness: in response to the services liberalization in the OECD countries,
the firms will increase the similarity of their exported varieties, while in the non-OECD countries, firms will
react to reduce the similarity. Lastly, we construct a conventional muti-product firm model to analyze the
mechanism of our empirical findings.
The rest of this paper is constructed in the following order. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes the properties of the data set, specifies the empirical models, and reports the empirical
results. Section 4 constructs a theoretical model and discusses the mechanism of the empirical findings.
Section 5 summarizes all our findings and conclusions.
3
2 Literature review
Many literature have discussed the impacts of the trade liberalization on the firms’ export performance,
but most of them focus on the commodity good trade. Generally, researchers find that the liberalization of
the commodity trade, which is usually performed as the tariffs reduction, will incentive the export growth
(Khandelwal et al., 2013; Bustos, 2011). However, some other literature argue that the trade liberalization
promotes the market competition, and then negatively affects firms’ export performance. For example,
Bernard et al. (2011) find that the trade liberalization process induces firms to shrink their product scope
and focus more on the production of the core products. Mayer et al. (2014) and Yi and Meng (2018) find
that the trade liberalization process incentives new firms to enter the market, and as a result, the market
competition becomes more intensive. A higher level of market competition reduces the incumbents’ profits
and forces them to reduce their product scope and concentrate the export value towards the core products.
Similarly, Nocke and Yeaple (2014) find that the firm’s marginal cost increases in the product scope, and
firms usually reduce their product scope to adapt the increasing intensity of market competition due to the
trade liberalization. In another study, Lopresti (2016) finds the heterogeneous reactions of the firms with
different export ratios in response to the trade liberalization. The firms who pursue relatively high proportion
of international sales will increase their product scopes, while the firms with low international participation
ratio will reduce their product scopes.
In the recent years, the study on the impacts of the services liberalization has been taken attentions by
many researchers. Most of the related literature focus on the study of the impacts on firms’ productivity,
and reach the conclusion that services liberalization promotes firms’ productivity. (Arnold et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2013; Beverelli et al., 2017) Based on the services restriction index for Czech computed by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Arnold et al., 2011 find that the reform
and FDI in the services sector increase the firms’ productivity. Arnold et al. (2016)constructs the reform
index for India’s services sector, and find that the services reform in 1991 promotes the growth of India’s
manufacturing sectors. Using the Chinese manufacturing firm data from the years 1998 to 2007, Zhang
et al. (2013) find that the services liberalization reduces the trade and investment barriers in the services
sector, lowers the services outsourcing cost, and promotes the services firms’ productivity and efficiency.
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In addition, the growth of services outsourcing promotes the domestic firms’ management efficiency and
technical innovations. In another paper, Beverelli et al. (2017) treats the services as the intermediate input
in the production process, and they find a similar effect of the services liberalization as Zhang et al. (2013),
i.e., the services liberalization increases firms’ productivity and this effect is more pronounced in the countries
with higher efficient institutions. Another group of literature study how the services liberalization affects
firms’ export performances. Some studies find a positive effect, i.e., the liberalization process increases
exporting firms’ export probability and value. (Barone and Cingano (2011); Li and Zhang (2018)) Naturally,
a higher level of barriers in the services sector will hinder firms’ export performances. (Nordas and Kim,
2013)
As many literature find the positive effect of the services liberalization on firms’ export performances, some
other studies try to disentangle the mechanism behind these findings. Generally, most literature believe that
the services liberalization reduces the firms’ production cost. Using the data of the OECD countries between
the years 1996 to 2002, Barone and Cingano (2011) find that less services restrictions are associated with the
higher value-added and export value in the downstream services-intensive industries. Using the firm survey
data from the World Bank, Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) find that the services liberalization promotes the
services sector’s productivity, and then increases the manufacturing firms’ export performances. Similarly,Li
and Zhang (2018) argue that the services liberalization promotes firms’ productivity through lowering the
price level of the foreign services and the market-entry cost for the exporting firms. In addition, the FDI in
the services sector has technology spillovers on the domestic firms. For example, the domestic firms can learn
the advanced management methods and production technologies from the foreign firms, and then increase
their innovation, management, production, and export performances. Sun et al. (2018) also reach a similar
conclusion as Li and Zhang (2018), i.e., the openness of the services sector increases firms’ export value by
lowering firms’ production cost. Using the Romanian and Chinese retailing sector data respectively, Javorcik
and Li (2013) and Head et al. (2014) find that a higher openness level of the retailing sector is associated
with a higher level of the export value. This is mainly due to the reduction in the information collection,
sales processing, and management cost. In another paper, Bas, 2014 studies the impacts of the openness in
India’s transportation and telecommunication sectors on exporting firms’ performances. They find that the
liberalization in these sectors lowers the firms’ both fixed and variable exporting costs, and then increases the
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firms’ export probability and value. Some other studies also find that the development of the internet sector
lowers the searching and matching cost between the upstream and downstream firms, and that between the
firms and customers. In addition, it lowers the exporting cost and promotes the firms’ export performances
(Shi, 2016).
Overview of the existing literature, we find that all of them focus on the study of the services liberalization
in the home country. There is no literature on how the destination country’s liberalization affects the
exporting firms’ performances. As discussed in the previous section, it is important to fill up this gap in the
existing literature. In this paper, we explore how the services liberalization process among the destination
countries affect Chinese exporting firms’ performances, i.e., export value, scope, and similarity. In addition,
we construct a tractable theoretical framework to analyze the mechanisms of our empirical findings.
3 Empirics
3.1 Data and model specification
3.1.1 Data
The data in this paper are retrieved from three sources: the first one is China’s customs data set covering
the years 2010 to 2016, which records each exporting firm’s transaction information, including the firm’s
registration number, product’s classification code (HS8 level), value and quantity, and export destination
country; the second one is the data set for the FDI restrictiveness index from the OECD organization, which
covers 22 services sub-sectors in 60 countries, and is used to measure the openness level of the services sector
in the destination countries; the last one records the input-output tables for each China’s province in 2012,
which reports the services-usage intensity of each manufacturing industry. To fit our analysis, we make the
following adjustments on the data. Firstly, as the international standard code is at the HS6 level, we re-assign
the HS6 code to the customs data. Secondly, we assign the provincial location for each firm based on the
firm registration number. Thirdly, we merge the customs data set with the FDI restrictiveness data set, and
the matching ratio is about 66%. Lastly, we identify the industry of each firm based on the HS4 classification
code, and merge the customs data with the input-output table in 2012.
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3.1.2 Key variables
Next, we will introduce how we construct the key variables, i.e., services trade liberalization index and export
variety.
Services trade liberalization index
We use the FDI restrictiveness index recorded by the OECD organization to measure services trade
liberalization in different countries. This index is constructed by four types of restrictions on the FDI, i.e.
the restriction on the ownership share, candidate screening and permission, rules on the key managers, and
the other restrictions on the operation of the foreign firms. The value for the index ranges from 0 to 1. A
higher value indicates a higher restriction level. As illustrated in Figure 1, which reports the data covering
55 countries during the period 2010 to 2017, the restriction levels in the OECD countries are relatively lower
those in the non-OECD countries. The restriction levels are getting lower in the non-OECD countries during
the reported period, but the changes in the OECD countries are insignificant.This data set covers eight
major sub-sectors of the services industry, including distribution, transport, hotels & restaurants, media,
communications, financial services, business services, and real estate investment, 60 countries, and the years
1997, 2003, 2006, and 2010 to 2017. The FDI restrictiveness index takes values from 0 to 1, with a higher
value indicates a higher restrictiveness level. Specifically, we construct the services openness index for each
destination country as follows.1
DSLdt = 1− FDI−resdt (1)
Similarly, we follow Arnold et al. (2011)and Zhang et al. (2013) and construct the openness index for each
province of China as follows. where FDI−resdt is the FDI restrictiveness index for each destination d in the
year t. Obviously, a higher value of DSLdt indicates a higher openness level.
CSLιrt =
∑
s
αιsr (1− FDI−resst) (2)
1Unlike the commodity good sector, it is difficult to construct a conventional restrictiveness index for the services sector.
Alternatively, most literature use the FDI restrictiveness index to measure the openness of the services sector, e.g. Fernandes
and Paunov (2012). )Sun et al. (2018) refers to the Chinese government’s policy on the foreign-ownership restrictions in each
services sub-sector to quantify the openness level of each sector. In this paper, we follow the existing literature and use the FDI
restrictiveness index to measure the openness level in the services sector.
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Figure 1: FDI restrictiveness index for countries,2010,2017
where αιsr is the service-usage share of the manufacturing sub-sector ι from the services sub-sector s in
the province r; FDI−resst is the FDI restrictiveness index of the sub-sector s in China. We use this index
as a control variable in our empirical model.
Export diversification
we use five indexes to measure the firms’ export diversification, . First, to investigate the product scope
adjustment, we measure product scope as the number of export varieties (6-digit Harmonized System (HS)
classification) of the firm f at year t (Iacovone and Javorcik (2010); Mayer et al. (2014))
Second, In order to capture not only discrete changes in the range of product scope, but also the distribu-
tion of sales across export products, we use Herfindahl-Hirschman-style index to measure diversity (Lopresti
(2016))
div−hhfdt = 1−
∑
i
 vfidt∑
i
vfidt
2 (3)
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div−enfdt = 1−
∑
i
 vfidt∑
i
vfidt
 ln
 vfidt∑
i
vfidt
 (4)
where div−hhfdt and div−enfdt are the diversify indexes for firm f in destination d and the year t,which
are computed following the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the index from Baldwin and Gu (2009)and
Bernard et al. (2011); vfidt is the export value of product i provided by firm f in the destination d and
the year t .All else being equal, the more diversified the firm sales is, the larger the index is. The main
advantage of this measure is its ability to capture the relative importance of product functions by considering
the proportion of products introduced in each segment.
Third, Following Mayer et al. (2014) and Chatterjee et al. (2013), we measure the skewness of each
firm in each destination country as: The skewness ratio is defined as the value or quantity ratio of the
largest exported variety to the second largest exported variety in each industry, i.e., sk01fdt ≡ v
m=1
fdt
vm=2fjt
or
sk02fdt ≡ v
m=1
fdt
vm=3fdt
. For this measure, we rank all the products exported by a firm according to the value of
exports to the destination country, and use this ranking as an indicator rank m for the product. Here, v
represents the sales of the product with ranking m.
Fourth, given that the unobserved changes firms presumably make to their product mix, product adding
and dropping also exert considerable influence on the product scope of firms. It is important to discover the
true importance of firms’ adjustments to their extensive margins. Following Bernard et al. (2011), we focus
on the features of product switching by continuing exporting firms. The first step is to identify if the firm
is an exporting firm. If the firm enters the exporting market from 2011 to 2016, we define that firm-year
observation as newfirm with a value of 1, otherwise 0. If the firm exit the exporting market from 2011-2015,
we define that firm-year observation as exitfirm with a value of 1, otherwise 0. If the firm is a continuing
exporter through 2010 to 2016, we define it as stayfirm with a value of 1, otherwise 0. The second step is to
identify the entry and exit in the destination country. If the firm enters the country from 2011 to 2016, we
define it as newfc with a value of 1, otherwise 0. If the firm exits the country through 2011-2015, we define
it as exitfc with a value of 1, otherwise 0. The third step is to identify the adding and dropping of product
within continuing exporters. If a product is added to the country by the firm during 2011-2016 and the firm
is neither a newfirm nor newfc, we define it as add with a value of 1, otherwise 0.If a product is dropped
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from the country by the firm during 2011-2015 and the firm is neither a exitfirm nor exitfc, we define it as
drop with a value of 1, otherwise 0. Finally, we definefcpadd and fcpdrop to represent the total number of
adding and dropping products respectively.
Last but not least is the Relatedness of export product mix. To further capture the relatedness of product
categories by considering the distance between different product functions, we use a concentric measure to
describe the relatedness of the product mix of each firm-country (Zahavi and Lavie (2013)).
relatednessfdt =
Nft∑
i
Nft∑
k
SfidtSfkdtrfikt (5)
where i, k = 1...n, with Nft being the number of product variety firm f has exported in the year t and
Sfidt (Sfkdt) is the share of product i (k) within the firm exports sales in destination d in the year t. rfikt
receives a value of 3 if i and k share the same six-digit HS, a value of 2 if they have different product functions
but share the same four-digit HS, a value of 1 if they have different product functions but share the same
two-digit HS and a value of 0 if they reflect different product functions. Table 1 below summarizes the
statistic characteristics of the key variables.
3.1.3 Model specification
To investigate the effects of services trade liberalization on China’s export strategy, we set up the estimation
equation as follows:
DVfhrdt = β0+β1DSLdt+β2CSLhrt+β3destariffhdt+β4Chinatariffht+β5GDPdt+β6GDP−pc+ef+ed+et+εfdt
(6)
f denotes firm,h denotes the industry, r denotes Chinese province,d denotes the export destination, t
denotes year. DV can be export value, export product scope (Number of varieties exported to each desti-
nation country), product diversification (div−hhfjt or div−enfjt), product skewness (sk01fjt or sk02fjt),
or product relatedness (relatenessfdt). The main explaining variable is the services trade liberalization in-
dex of exporting destination country (DSLdt). Control variables include China’s services trade liberalization
CSLhrt, the import tariffs of China (Chinatariffht), the import tariffs of destination country(destariffhdt),
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GDP, and GDP per capita of the destination countries. We also include firm fixed effects (ef ),destination
fixed effects(ed)and year fixed effects (et). εfdt is the error term. Note that all variables are in the log-form,
except the services openness indexes DSLdt and CSLhrt.
3.2 Empirical results and robustness checks
3.2.1 Baseline results
To investigate the effects of destination countries services trade liberalization on China’s exporting diversi-
fication strategy, we firstly estimate the effects of services trade liberalization on China’s export value and
exporting product diversification according to equation (1) based on the sample of continuously exporting
firms. The results are presented in 5 (see the Appendix),services trade liberalization in destination countries
promote the export value and export diversification. According to column (2),services trade liberalization
index increases 10%, firms exporting to more liberalized countries will increase 15.92% (0.1e0.465).Services
liberalization index increased 10%,export variety will increase 12.7% (0.1e0.242)based on HS6. DSL will also
promote export diversification by increasing export diversification indexed by HH index and decreasing export
skewness, as the results shown in column (9)-(16). DSL increases 10% will promote export diversification
about 10.21% (0.1e0.0207) and 11.48% (0.1e0.138).
For the baseline results, we could not consider the entry and exit of the exporting product, so we change
the dependent variable to the export product switch as defined above and re-estimate equation 6. The
results in 5 (see the Appendix) show that the DSL will significantly encourage exporting firms adding more
products, but have less effects on product exiting. A 10% increase of the DSL will induce the exporting
firms to add about 16.18% product into more services liberalized destination. When we divide the samples
to OECD and non-OECD countries, some different results are found as shown in the last four columns. For
OECD countries, The DSL will promote more product entering, but have no significant effects on product
exiting; while for the non-OECD countries, the DSL will promote the exporting firms to take more flexible
product switching strategies. Not only more products are added into more liberalized developing countries,
but also more products exit the market. One explanation for the different exporting behavior is that the
market competition in OECD countries is more severe and services sectors are more liberalized.So Chinese
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exporting firms take more conservative product strategy and obtain its competitiveness by more varieties to
realize scale economy. For the non-OECD countries with lower level of services trade liberalization, if the
exporting firms have entered this market with more prophase entry costs, they will take more active behavior
to expand the product scope and reduce the risks of operation.
According to the results of product scope in 5 (see the Appendix), we find that the DSL increase the
number of product by measures all digit levels of HS6, HS4 and HS2. But the coefficients for measure of
HS2 are smaller than HS6, and that means product diversification is conducted within the related products.
However, the less related product diversification could also be chosen by exporting firms because the coef-
ficients for HS2 are also positive and significant. Thus, more discussion are needed for the relatedness of
product diversification strategy. The results are presented in 5 (see the Appendix). For the whole sample,
we find the insignificant effects of the DSL on the relatedness. But when we divide the sample to OECD and
non-OECD countries, some interesting results present. The DSL increases the relatedness of diversification
for OECD countries, while it promotes the unrelatedness of diversification for non-OECD countries. These
results enforce the former conclusions of China’s exporting product strategy in different destinations with
the balancing choice of scale economy and risk aversions. Since the severe competitions in OECD markets,
China’s exporting firms could focus on their key competitive products and export more related products to
realize the scale economy. While, for the non-OECD markets, due to less liberalized services market and
weak business environment, China’s exporters could gain more profits by taking more unrelated diversification
strategies.
3.2.2 Robustness checks
To investigate the mechanisms of how services trade liberalization on export diversification, more results for
liberalization of main services sectors are obtained. We also do robustness test on heterogeneous effects by
firm ownership and institutional environment of the destination countries.
Main services sectors
Services trade liberalization will decrease exporting costs and lower the threshold of market entry, so in
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general , promote export probability and total exporting values (Bas, 2014). However, services liberalization
will have effects on the choice of product strategy in different destination, with more product variety and
flexible product switch in more liberalized destination in order to balance the scale economy and risk aversions.
Thus we investigate the mechanism of how services trade liberalization on China’s export product strategy by
focusing on different services sectors, such as distribution (wholesale and retail), transportation, information,
finance and business services sectors. So the interaction of liberalization for each service sector with the
services input intensities are included in the estimation, and the results for product scope and diversification
measured by HH index are shown in 5 (see the Appendix). 2 DSL in distribution, transportation and finance
sectors have positive and significant effects on product diversification, while Liberalization in information
and business sectors have positive but not all the significant effects on diversification. The openness of
distribution sectors helps exporting firms get access to the distribution channels, market information, and
decrease the marketing costs and information searching costs,(Javorcik and Li, 2013; Head et al., 2014).
Transportation liberalization will help exporting firms promote the transportation efficiency and decrease
the transportation costs. Finance services liberalization could bring more financing instruments, decrease
financing costs, increase financing efficiency (Javorcik and Li, 2013). While, since business services and
information services sectors are less liberalized in developing countries and more competitive in developed
countries, though liberalization in information services sectors can decrease the information costs (Shi, 2016)
and liberalization in business services sectors can introduce more management experience and increase the
management efficiency (Sun et al., 2018), but Chinese exporting firms could not compete with the competitive
foreign multinational firms, so the effects are insignificant.
By firm ownership
Robustness for firm ownership are presented in 5 (see the Appendix). The baseline results still hold
no matter of the firm ownership. DSL has positive and significant effects on product diversification for
state-owned enterprises, foreign invested firms and private firms.
By institution environment of the destination countries
2Due to the space limitation, the results for other measure are not included here, but the main conclusions all hold.
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Services trade liberalization might be not effective if the institution environment is not good enough
for the implementation of services liberalization and domestic regulations. Beverelli et al. (2017) find that
lowering services trade barriers could promote productivity only with a powerful and effective institutional
environment. So how could the institution environment affect China’s export diversification strategy? We
include the interaction of the DSL with destination’s institution environment which is indexed by government
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption as calculated and reported in the WGI database of World
Bank. These three index are from -2.5 to 2.5, then we normalize them to 0-5 in our estimation for the
explanations of the results. In 5 (see the Appendix), the DSL has a larger effect on the product diversification
in the destinations with better institution environment. Therefore, Chinese exporting firms could also pay
attention to the implementation of the liberalization in services sectors, since most services sectors needs
with-border regulation of the local governments.
4 Theoretical framework
4.1 Households
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Dhingra (2013), and Qiu and Yu (2014), we assume the consumers’
utility function for country j is the form of the quasi-linear preference:
Ud = qd0 +
∫
i∈Ωd
(α+ zi) qdidi− 1
2
βA
(∫
i∈ΩAd
qdidi
)2
− 1
2
βB
(∫
i∈ΩBd
qdidi
)2
− 1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ωd
q2didi (7)
where qd0 is her consumption of the numeraire good; qdi is the consumption of variety i in country d; Ω
A
d
is the set of all varieties from the industry A that sold in country d ; ΩBd is the set of all varieties from the
industry B that sold in country d ; zi is the quality of product i.
The quasi-linear preference assumes a constant marginal utility of the numeraire good (captured by the
first term), a decreasing marginal utility for the differentiate good (captured by the second and fourth terms
with a quadratic formula), and a measure of the competition among the differentiate products in each industry
(captured by the third and forth terms). The quasi-linear preference captures the consumption feature that
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consumers compare when deciding the purchase amount among different varieties and deciding whether or
not to buy a variety. For example, if the price of one variety is relatively high compared with other varieties,
and then the sales of this variety will be relatively low. If the price of the variety increases further, then the
consumers may decide not to buy this product and save money on the consumption of the numeraire good.
The advantage of choosing this preference is that it induces a market demand function, which can allow firms
to frequently withdraw their varieties from the market.
The consumer maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint, i.e.,
pd0qd0 +
∫
i∈Ωd
pdiqdidi ≤W (8)
where W is the income of a typical consumer, which is identical across countries. Without loss of generality,
we assume the price of the numeraire good is identical across countries and normalized as one. The prices of
the differentiated products are different across country-variety pairs.
From the above, it follows that the demand function for variety i belonging to industry χ in country d is
qdi = Ldqdi = Ld
(
α+ zi
γ
− 1
γ
pdi − βχ
γ
Qχd
)
(9)
where χ = A, B ; and Qχd ≡
∫
i∈Ωχd qdidi is an index of the consumption of all the differentiated products
in industry χ of country d and Ld denotes the population size of country d.
Here, we conduct a conventional method to identify whether the two products belong to different varieties
or not. The products are categorized as follows: they are different varieties if they are produced by different
firms or their HS8 or HS6 codes are different; they belong to different industries if their HS2 codes are
different.
4.2 Manufacturing firms
In each industry, the firms produce variety i with the productivity level ϕi , where i ∈ N . Firm-specific
productivity for variety i is assumed to be given by ϕi = κi
−1, where κ is the firm-specific general productivity
measurements, representing overall efficiency factors, including management level, transferable technologies,
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etc. The cost function for the representative firm f is composed of two parts:
Cf =
∫
d∈Jf
[∫
i∈Ωf
(
c
ϕi
qdidi+ Fi
)
di
]
dj (10)
Here, to avoid a cumbersome notation, we have omitted the subscript f in the symbol for the firm-specific
productivity level. Fi is the sunk cost for the firm f to be able to produce variety i . Ωf collects all
varieties produced by the firm f , and Jf collects all the markets in which the firm f sells its products. As
a conventional assumption following Qiu and Yu (2014), we assume a non-decreasing marginal cost function
in variety i. In this case, we have r ≥ 1. Then, we can write the profit function for firm f as follows:
pif =
∫
d∈Jf
{∫
i∈Ωf
[
δdpdiqdi − c
ϕi
qdi − Fi
]
di
}
dj (11)
where δd ≤ 1 indicates the ice-berg cost to transport products to country d, which is a decreasing function
in the service price index of country d, i.e., δd = ςd
(
PSd
)−r
and r > 0.
The firms make decisions on both the price of each variety and the total number of varieties in the specific
country. Without loss of generality, to simplify our analysis, we make the following conventional assumptions.
All Chinese exporting firms are identical, which means they share the same technology and the same marginal
cost on each variety. To simplify our analysis without losses of generality, we assume there are fixed number
of firms in the destination markets, which include the Chinese firms and the domestic firms of the destination
country. 3 We separate the products into two industrial categories, industry A and B. Industry A is the
primary industry, which requires relatively low marginal cost on each variety; and industry B is high-tech
industry, which requires relatively high marginal cost on each variety. We assume product iA ∈ N belongs
to industry A, and product iB ∈ N belongs to industry B. Productivity on each variety is different within
the firm-industry boundary, and for convenience, the productivity of product iA or iB is denoted in the
decreasing order of productivity, e.g. ϕk < ϕm if m > k .We also separate the destination countries into
two groups, i.e., the developing and developed countries. In the developing countries, the domestic firms are
identical to Chinese firms, i.e., they share the same quality levels zL for all the products in both industries A
and B. In developed countries, the domestic firms are superior than Chinese firms in product quality in the
3Due to the home market effect or border effect, the majority firms are domestic firms in the destination countries. Thus,
we believe it is reasonable to crowd out the effects from the third country’s firms.
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industry B, i.e., zH > zL, but they share the same quality with Chinese firms in the industry A , i.e., zL. This
assumption is equivalent to assume that the developed countries pursue absolute advantage in the industry
B, and the developing countries pursue comparative advantage in the industry A. Lastly, to make sure the
total number of varieties that each firm is able to produce is unbounded above, we assume the variety-fixed
cost is zero, i.e., Fi = 0.
Then a typical firm’s optimal price, quantity, and export scope strategies to each country j in industry χ
are solved as:

pdi = max
{
0, 12
[
α+ zL − βχQχd + cδdϕi
]}
qdi = max
{
0, L2γ
[
α+ zL − βχQχd − cδdϕi
]}
Mχ∗j = max
{
0, δj
(
κ
c
)
(α+ zL − βχQχd )
} (12)
Given all the solutions above, we can further solve for the total number of varieties exported to a typical
country j as:
M∗j =

δj
(
κ
c
) (
α+ zL − βAQAd
)
if βBQ
B
d ≥ α+ zL ≥ βAQAd
δj
(
κ
c
) (
α+ zL − βBQBd
)
if βAQ
A
d ≥ α+ zL ≥ βBQBd
δj
(
κ
c
) [∑
χ
(α+ zL − βχQχd )
]
if α+ zL ≥ max
χ
{βχQχd}
(13)
Next, we will focus the case when Chinese firms export all products to each market, i.e., α + zL ≥
max
χ
{βχQχd}, and analyze how the firms will adjust their export scope in response to a reduction in service
cost due to the service sector liberalization.
4.3 Service firms and the services sector trade liberalization
We assume that there are NS number of service sub-sectors in each country. In each sub-sector, the service
suppliers face perfect price competition. In this case, if a manufacturing firm would like to get service from
the sub-sector ν, this firm will choose a supplier that offers the lowest price, i.e.,
pSdν = min
ι
{(
1 + τSdνι
)
pSdνι
}
(14)
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where τSdνι is the tariff rate or restriction index for supplier ι to operate in country d.
To make a certain amount of sales in country d, a typical firm needs to use the services from all service
sub-sectors. Specifically, this firm chooses the service usage from each sub-sectors by solving the following
problem:
min
∑
ν
pSdνx
S
dν (15)
s.t.
[∑
ν
(
xSdν
) 1
θ
]θ
≥ X¯Sd
where pSdν is the service price in sub-sector ν; x
S
dν is the service usage from each sub-sector ν; X¯
S
d is the
minimum requirement of composition service to sell one unit of product in country d.
Based on this setting, we can solve for the service sector’s composite price index as:
PSd =
[∑
ν
(
pSdν
)− θ1−θ ]− 1−θθ (16)
Obviously, a decrease of restriction index τSdνι will reduce the value of price index P
S
d , and further lower
the ice-berg cost for each firm-variety. In this paper, we concern the properties of three variables, i.e., the
quantity of each variety, the export scope, and export skewness ratio in each market. The skewness ratio
is defined as the quantity ratio of the largest exported variety to the second largest exported variety in
the country d, i.e., skd ≡
α+zL−βχQχd− cδdϕ1
α+zL−βχQχd− cδdϕ2
or
(α+zL−βχQχd)
2−
(
c
δdϕ1
)2
(α+zL−βχQχd)
2−
(
c
δdjϕ2
)2 , where ϕ1 > ϕ2. 4 To explicit how
quantity, export scope, and export skewness ratio change in response to a reduction of service cost, we can
4 Here, for convenience purpose, we compare the value ratio within each industry. Our analysis conclusion doesn’t change
when the comparison turns to be between two different industries’ products, only if the export quantity increases in the variety’s
productivity.
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equivalently take first order condition of these variables with respect to the ice-berg cost.

∂qdi
∂δd
= c
δ2dϕi
− βχ ∂Q
χ
d
∂δd
∂Mχ∗d
∂δd
= κc
[
2 (α+ zL)− βχ
(
Qχd + δd
∂Qχd
∂δd
)]
∂M∗d
∂δd
= κc
[
2 (α+ zL)−
∑
χ
βχ
(
Qχd + δd
∂Qχd
∂δd
)]
∂skd
∂δd
=
(
α+zL−βχQχd− cδdϕ2
)(
c
δ2
d
ϕ1
−βχ ∂Q
χ
d
∂δd
)
−
(
α+zL−βχQχd− cδdϕ1
)(
c
δdϕ2
−βχ ∂Q
χ
d
∂δd
)
(
α+zL−βχQχd− cδdϕ2
)2
(17)
Observing these results, we find that, the signs of these derivatives depend on the sign of
∂Qχd
∂δd
and the
relative scale of parameter βx . Firstly, it’s easy to see that the sign of
∂Qχd
∂δd
is positive. A reduction of service
cost in country d will induce the expansion of exporting volume and varieties to country d. Otherwise,
confliction emerges in the quantity and export scope equations. Furthermore, if the parameter βχ is small
enough, i.e., βχ <
2(α+zL)
Qχd+δd
∂Q
χ
d
∂δd
, then in a typical developing country u in industry χ, the signs of these
derivatives are:

∂qdu
∂δu
R 0
∂Mχ∗u
∂δu
> 0
∂M∗u
∂δu
> 0
∂sku
∂δu
< 0
(18)
The properties of the changes of theses variables in response to a service trade liberalization are summa-
rized as the following proposition.
Next, we will check the results when the market becomes a developed country n. The firm’s strategies
are also described by equations (12) and (13). Now, as the developed countries’ firms produce relatively high
quality products in the industry B, the signs of each derivatives may change. For example, if the change of
quantity index (competition level) in industry B satisfies the following property zH > βB
(
QBd + δd
∂QBd
∂δd
)
−
α > zL, then Chinese firms will reduce export varieties to this country in the industry B. Notice that this
property doesn’t conflict the condition that
∂Qχd
∂δd
> 0. The results in the industry A are the same as in the
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developing country case, i.e., zL > βA
(
QAd + δd
∂QAd
∂δd
)
− α. Otherwise, no firm enters the market. Given the
conditions above, we reach the following results on the sign of each derivative.

∂qin
∂δn
R 0
∂MA∗n
∂δn
> 0
∂MB∗n
∂δn
< 0
∂M∗n
∂δn
R 0
∂skn
∂δn
< 0
(19)
The results in equation(19) indicate that in the industry A, Chinese firms will expand their export scope,
while in the industry B, Chinese firms will reduce their export scope. The net effect on the total number
of varieties is uncertainty. We will use the export product’s relatedness index to check these predictions. A
reduction in the relatedness index in response to the service trade liberalization is consistent with the result
that export scope increases within one industry but reduces in another industry.
5 Conclusion
Our study investigates empirically and theoretically the effects of services trade liberalization in destination
countries on exporting product strategy . The empirical results show that service trade liberalization in
exporting destinations has a significantly positive impact on product diversification of China’s export. More-
over, service trade liberalization will make exporters more flexible in the adjustment of product scope, so that
can actively and flexibly adjust the product scope and diversity according to different destinations. Services
trade liberalization increases the relatedness of diversification for OECD countries, but lowers the relatedness
of diversification for non-OECD countries,and has larger effects on product diversification in the destinations
with better institution environment. Then, our paper discusses the mechanisms of service trade liberalization
by different services sectors. Some robustness checks are made by firm ownership and destination institution.
With a conventional multi-product firm model, we explore the mechanisms behind all our empirical findings.
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